BEIRUT — Middle East observers would be forgiven for thinking they were in a time machine when Syria’s rebels blitzed last week through the country’s northwestern regions, capturing Aleppo in a stunning advance that has reignited the country’s long-dormant civil war.
Over the past seven days, the rebels — long considered a fractured, hopelessly compromised force — have routed Syrian army troops from their bases and positions, making gains in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama provinces. The offensive represents the most serious threat since 2019 to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and his backers in Iran and Russia.
After an initial retreat, loyalist forces are regrouping, with reports of Syrian army units and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias mobilizing toward Hama to stay the opposition’s advance. Meanwhile, Russian warplanes have launched airstrikes on overrun neighborhoods of Aleppo and pounded rebel-held areas to the north. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a watchdog group with a network of activists in the country, says more than 600 people have been killed in the recent fighting, including more than 100 civilians.
The clashes have brought back to attention a civil war that has largely fallen out of the headlines despite never really ending.
Here’s a look at what happened and what it could mean for the different players.
Who is involved and why is it important?
The belligerents are the last survivors of Syria’s hugely destructive civil war, which began in 2011 as another Arab Spring revolution, with antigovernment protesters demanding Assad leave.
The government moved to destroy them, unleashing troops and state-backed thugs in a wave of brutality. That triggered an armed rebellion that, at its peak, comprised dozens of armed factions across the country, including Gulf-backed Islamist militias, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda affiliates, and moderate groups supported by the U.S. and other Western countries.
But they could never fully unite. Assad fought back, calling upon Iran and Tehran-backed armed groups including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, to bolster his troops. In 2015, Russia entered on the government side, turning the tide of the war in Assad’s favor.
By the time the war settled into a stalemate around 2019, more than half a million people were killed, millions more displaced or made refugees, and the country was in ruins. But Assad controlled 70% of it.
The rest was balkanized under three rival administrations: One in the northwest province of Idlib, led by the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group once linked to Al-Qaeda (it disassociated in 2016) and which remains designated a terrorist group by the U.S; a coalition of Turkish-supported militias that rule — with Ankara’s assistance — a portion of the north; and the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish militia that controls a U.S.-backed protectorate in the country’s northeast, with some 900 U.S. soldiers stationed in the area to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State.
That dizzying array of fighters and patrons means what happens in Syria is unlikely to stay in Syria. A change in who rules the country would have ripple effects across the region, and would represent a significant upset in the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, not to mention Iran.
Why did the offensive start now?
Events in Syria cannot be detached from the fallout of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel. Israel’s subsequent war in Lebanon has weakened Hezbollah and with it Iran, both of them crucial Assad allies. Russia too is distracted with its own war in Ukraine, meaning it has less forces to devote to Assad’s survival.
Israel, which occupies Syria-claimed Golan Heights, is also focusing its ire on Iran’s proxy forces. In recent months, it has intensified its attacks on Iran-affiliated groups in Syria, further degrading Tehran’s power.
All that made it an opportune moment for the opposition to attack.
What is happening on the ground?
The offensive is spearheaded by HTS and some of its jihadist allies, along with a Turkish-backed umbrella group called the Syrian National Army. They launched a two-pronged attack, and have taken over an estimated 170 square miles of territory. That includes Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and its economic powerhouse, which the rebels first entered in 2012 before being ousted four years later.
Now they are poised to chomp off parts of the country’s center. They’ve also netted significant amounts of weapons and supplies, including jet planes and helicopters from the Syrian army.
On Wednesday, state-run media reported the Syrian army had clawed back some territory in Hama and was planning a counterattack.
What does it mean for Assad and his allies?
Before this rebel resurgence, Assad’s survival seemed a fait accompli. The war had hollowed out his government and the army, and forced him to pawn whatever remained to Iran and Russia, but Assad nevertheless believed he was secure enough to wait out his opponents. He refused to negotiate with the opposition or Turkey, and insisted the U.S. leave the country.
Assad’s biggest loss may be among Syrians living under his rule. Many sided with him less out of genuine loyalty than fear of chaos, looting and persecution under the fragmented opposition. Yet army troops proved unable or unwilling to protect the local population, offering little resistance and resorting to airstrikes on Aleppo — moves that are unlikely to endear the government to the local population.
At the same time, a large number of the participating factions espouse jihadist ideologies most Syrians reject. But so far the opposition has been careful with civilians. Videos on social media depict bearded fighters walking down city streets, reassuring Christians and other minorities of their safety. And activists say fighters have been disciplined in not harassing residents.
If the opposition can keep its gains, maintain cohesion and rehabilitate its image among Syrians, Assad may be forced into serious concessions in exchange for his survival.
One idea floated in recent days is that Assad turn away from Moscow and Tehran in exchange for sanctions relief. For Iran, that would mean the loss of a major node in the logistics train it uses to supply Hezbollah. It would also further weaken the so-called Axis of Resistance, the Iran-led constellation of governments and paramilitary factions arrayed against the U.S. and Israel.
Russia, which has a presence on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, would lose a reliable client in the region, not to mention an airbase in the Middle East and the only warm-water port for its navy.
For the moment, neither Assad nor his allies show signs of backing down. In statements and interviews, government officials insist the army is on the attack against rebels, whom they call terrorists, and Iranian emissaries have pledged to back Assad to the hilt. Russia has scrambled its warplanes to attack rebel-controlled areas in Idlib and Aleppo.
What does Turkey get out of it?
Turkey has been backing the opposition since 2011 and has shouldered the largest number of refugees from the fighting. It initially insisted Assad must go, but almost 14 years later, the greater priority for Turkish President Recep Tayyep Erdogan is to send refugees back home, and destroy the SDF, the Kurdish militia he believes is linked to Ankara-proscribed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK.
In their capture of Aleppo, the rebels now encircle several neighborhoods controlled by the SDF, and have promised the Kurdish fighters safe passage to northeast Syria. It is unclear if they have done so.
A success against the Kurds now is likely to play well for Turkey when Trump enters office next month. During his first term, Trump repeatedly tried to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, decrying their deployment there as a costly-but-useless foreign intervention. A Kurdish defeat may convince him staying is no longer tenable.
Is this a win for the U.S. and Israel?
Leaders in both countries would be pleased to see Assad go. But if he stays on the condition of curtailing Iranian and Russian influence, it’s still a win because Iran wouldn’t be able to ferry arms to Hezbollah or threaten Israel through Syria, and it would lose a major outlet for its sanctioned economy. Russia’s loss in Syria would allow the U.S. a freer hand in the region.
Still, war in Syria has proved to be a transnational problem in the past, when the resurgence of Islamic State saw the U.S. lead a coalition of countries in a years-long campaign to destroy the extremist group. The conflicts there have also sparked a refugee exodus that altered Europe’s political landscape and empowered anti-immigrant right-wing parties. Iraq and Jordan face being destabilized, adding to their woes amid the turmoil of the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.
The chaos could also hit Israel. Assad so far has kept his forces out of the fight with Israel in its war with Hamas and Hezbollah. He has also put up little resistance to Israel’s repeated attacks against Iranian assets in the country. There are no guarantees that will continue.
